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only if they are connected by the network. These games have many
sequential equilibria; nonetheless, the behavior of subjects in the labo-
ratory is predictable. The network architecture makes some strategies
salient and this in turn makes the subjects’ behavior predictable and
facilitates coordination on eﬃcient outcomes. In some cases, modal
behavior corresponds to equilibrium strategies.
JEL Classification Numbers: D82, D83, C92.
Key Words: experiment, monotone games, imperfect information,
networks, coordination, strategic commitment, strategic delay, equilib-
rium selection, salience.
1 Introduction
A perennial question in economics concerns the conditions under which indi-
viduals cooperate and coordinate to achieve an eﬃcient outcome. In a series
of papers, Gale (1995, 2001) showed that, under certain conditions, cooper-
ation arises naturally in the class of monotone games. A monotone game is
like a repeated game except that actions are irreversible: players are con-
strained to choose stage-game strategies that are non-decreasing over time.
This irreversibility structure allows players to make commitments. Every
time a player makes a commitment, it changes the structure of the game and
the incentives for other players to cooperate.
Choi et al. (2008), henceforth CGK, conduct a theoretical and experimen-
tal study of a class of simple monotone games that are naturally interpreted
as step-level, or threshold, public good games. Each player has an endow-
ment of tokens E that he can either keep for himself or contribute toward the
cost of an indivisible public good. The good costsK tokens to complete. The
players make irreversible contributions to the public good at a sequence of
dates. At the end of T periods, the public good is provided if and only if the
sum of the contributions is large enough to meet the cost of the good. Each
player assigns the value V to the good, so his utility if the good is provided
is equal to V plus his endowment minus his contribution. If the good is not
provided, his payoﬀ equals his endowment minus his contribution.
The main theoretical result in CGK is that, if the length of the game
T is greater than the cost of the good K (and certain side constraints are
satisfied), then players must cooperate and provide the good with positive
probability (probability one in a pure-strategy equilibrium). Thus, the tim-
ing and irreversibility of decisions can help avoid uncooperative equilibria.
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However, the coordination problem remains a potential obstacle to eﬃciency.
A central assumption in CGK is that information is perfect: every player
is assumed to be informed about the entire history of actions that have al-
ready been taken. Perfect information and sequential choice can make it
easier for players to coordinate their actions if they are so inclined. Clearly,
imperfect information can be an obstacle to cooperation. In the extreme case
where no player has any information about the other players’ prior actions,
the situation is essentially the same as in the one-shot game, where players
contribute simultaneously to the provision of the public good. For interme-
diate cases, with partial information, the central result of CGK continues to
hold: under weak conditions, sequential rationality implies provision of the
public good with positive probability. Our motivation for the present study
is to determine the eﬀect of the information structure in this intermediate
range — between the cases of zero and perfect information — on coordination,
dynamics, and eﬃciency.
The imperfect information structure is represented by a directed graph
that specifies the information flows in the group, i.e., who observes whose
past actions. Each player is located at a node of the graph. Player i can
observe player j if and only if there is an edge leading from node i to node j.
The network architecture is common knowledge to the players. The experi-
ments reported here involve the benchmark three-person empty and complete
networks, and all three-person networks with one or two edges. We call the
unique 1-edge network the one-link network. There are four 2-edge networks,
called the line, the star-in, the star-out, and the pair network. The complete
set of networks is illustrated in Figure 1, where an arrow pointing from player
i to player j indicates that player i can observe player j. The set of networks
illustrated in Figure 1 is essentially complete in the sense that any other
network with one or two edges is simply a re-labeling of these networks.
[Figure 1 here]
This set of networks has several non-trivial architectures, each of which
gives rise to its own distinctive information flows. To keep the scope of our
study within reasonable bounds, we exclude the large set of networks with
three, four and five edges. For practical purposes, the networks with zero,
one or two edges provide a suﬃciently rich set of networks, reveal important
features of the game, and provide a reasonable test of the theory.
The games that make up the various treatments in our experiments diﬀer
only with respect to their network architecture. The other parameters are
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the same for all treatments. There are three players, each of whom has an
endowment consisting of a single token (E = 1). The cost of the public good
is two tokens (K = 2), so that some coordination is required to provide the
public good and there is an opportunity for one player to free-ride. There
are three periods in the game (T = 3). The value of the public good is two
tokens (V = 2), so it is always eﬃcient for the good to be provided.
Although the multiplicity of sequential equilibria means that standard
theory makes only weak predictions about the outcome of the game, the
actual behavior we observe is predictable and sensitive to the network archi-
tecture. We emphasize that even if subjects do not “play” an equilibrium
strategy profile, the specific architecture of the network clearly induces some
patterns of contributions more than others, both with regard to the identity
of contributors and the timing of their contributions. Such coordination may
not only lead to more predictable behavior, it can also improve the eﬃciency
of the outcome. Note that even if the public good is provided, the outcome
may be ineﬃcient because subjects contribute too much. And, of course,
if the good is provided with probability less than one, it is of considerable
interest to know how often it is provided and why.
The main regularities we observe can be summarized under four headings:
• Strategic commitment: There is a tendency for subjects in certain
network positions to make contributions early in the game in order to
encourage others to contribute. Clearly, commitment is of strategic
value only if it is observed by others. Strategic commitment tends to
be observed among uninformed-and-observed subjects, i.e., subjects in
positions where (i) they cannot observe other positions and (ii) they
are observed by another position.
We observe strategic commitment in the laboratory in position B in the
one-link network, position C in the line network, and position A in the star-
in network. The eﬀect is strongest for position C in the line network and
appears to be associated with the high level of eﬃciency in that network.
• Strategic delay: There is a tendency for subjects in certain network
positions to delay their decisions until they have observed a contri-
bution by a subject in another position. Obviously, there is an option
value of delay only if the decision depends on the information. Strategic
delay tends to be observed among informed-and-unobserved subjects,
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i.e., subjects in positions where (i) they can observe other positions and
(ii) they are not observed by another position.
We observe strong evidence of strategic delay among all subjects in positions
where they can observe another subject, particularly in position A of the
one-link network, position B of the line network, and position A of the star-
out.
• Mis-coordination: We also identify situations in which there are
problems coordinating on an eﬃcient outcome. Mis-coordination tends
to arise in networks where two players are symmetrically situated. In
symmetric situations, it becomes problematic for two players to know
who should go first or, if only one is to contribute, which of two should
contribute.
There is evidence of coordination failure in networks where two subjects,
such as B and C in the star-out and star-in networks and A and B in the
pair network, are symmetrically situated.
• Equilibrium: In some cases, the modal behavior corresponds with
easily identifiable salient equilibria. This is not to claim that subjects
are actually playing equilibrium strategies, just that the modal behavior
corresponds to what some equilibria would predict.
The modal behavior of subjects in the line and star-out networks corresponds
to the strategies that would be chosen in equilibria that involve strategic com-
mitment by observed and uninformed players and strategic delay by informed
and unobserved players.
Thus, our experiment finds empirical support for these ideas: there is
strategic delay; there is strategic commitment; symmetry leads to mis-coordination
(with some caveats); and in some networks where the degree of coordination
is high, the modal behavior of the subjects corresponds to a single equi-
librium or class of equilibria. There are anomalies, of course, and in those
cases we investigate behavior at the level of the individual subject to deter-
mine whether these anomalies are systematic or attributable to only a few
individuals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A discussion of the core
literature on salience and other related literatures is provided in Section 2.
Section 3 describes the theoretical model and Section 4 outlines the research
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questions that we attempt to answer in the rest of the paper. Section 5 sum-
marizes the experimental design and procedures. The results are gathered in
Section 6 and Section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Our use of the term salient refers to structural properties of the game, par-
ticularly the dominance of strategic delay for some players and the eﬀects of
strategic commitment on other players. In somewhat related papers, Cooper
et al. (1990), Van Huyck et al. (1990, 1991), and Straub (1995) studied co-
ordination via payoﬀs-based notions, including risk- and payoﬀ-dominance.
Our concept of salience, based on structural properties of the game, is closer
to the one explored by these authors than it is to the concept of “psycho-
logical” salience introduced by Schelling (1960) as part of his theory of focal
equilibria.
In Schelling’s account, what makes an equilibrium focal is its psycholog-
ical “frame,” rather than its structural properties. He argued that, in the
description of a pure coordination game with multiple equilibria, the labels of
the strategies may have an eﬀect on the players’ behavior. When there is no
other reason to choose among a set of strategies, players will choose the strat-
egy with the most salient label. The resulting equilibrium is called a focal
point. Lewis (1969) used the concept of salience as an element of his theory of
conventions (see also Cubitt and Sugden, 2003). Tests of Schelling’s notion
of salience in the context of one-shot coordination games are provided by
Crawford and Haller (1990), Mehta et al. (1994), Sugden (1995), Bacharach
and Bernasconi (1997), Blume (2000), Bardsley et al. (2006) and Crawford
et al. (2008).
Our paper is also related to the large literature on coordination games
in experimental economics (see Crawford, 1997, Camerer, 2003, and Devetag
and Ortmann, 2007 for comprehensive discussions). Of particular interest
are several articles that examine the eﬀect of sequential timing in resolv-
ing coordination problems under conditions of imperfect information. The
first such paper of which we are aware is Cooper et al. (1993) who examine
strategic behavior in a “blinded” sequential battle of the sexes game, where
the first player’s move is not revealed to the second player but the timing is
common knowledge. They find much higher rates of coordination and higher
eﬃciency compared to a simultaneous-play version of the game. Rapoport
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(1997) investigates similar issues in a three-person battle of the sexes game
and Budescu et al. (1997) report results from a similar information treatment
applied to common-pool resource dilemmas. Weber et al. (2004) provide a
summary of experimental findings about these eﬀects, which they call “vir-
tual observability,” and run some additional coordination-game experiments,
in which they observe similar eﬀects. These studies are diﬀerent from ours
in several respects. First, they consider only the no-information case, where
previous moves were completely unobservable by later players. Second, a sin-
gle player moves in each stage of the game, whereas, in our study, all players
move simultaneously in each stage of the game.
There is a small body of work on monotone games with perfect informa-
tion. Admati and Perry (1991) introduced the basic concepts and their work
was extended by Marx and Matthews (2000). Gale (1995, 2001) developed
the theory applied in this paper in two diﬀerent environments. Duﬀy et al.
(2007) investigate the model of Marx and Matthews (2000) experimentally
and show that positive provision can be supported in a dynamic laboratory
setting.
Following the seminal paper of Erev and Rapoport (1990), a number
of experimental papers analyzed the eﬀect of the information structure on
public-good provision. Most recently, Ngan and Au (2008) extended Erev
and Rapoport (1990) to investigate the eﬀect of information in a real-time,
step-level, public good game. While the games we study share some of the
features of these games, we address diﬀerent questions. Most importantly,
the previous literature mainly focuses on the sensitivity of provision in dif-
ferent information treatments whereas we focus on the impact of network
architecture on the salience of equilibrium behavior.
There is a large and growing literature on the economics of networks
(see Jackson, 2008). Although network experiments in economics are recent,
there is now a large experimental literature on the economics of networks.
(see Kosfeld, 2004, Goyal, 2005, and Jackson, 2005, for excellent, if now
already somewhat dated, surveys). To the best of our knowledge, all of the
previous experimental work on networks have quite diﬀerent focuses than
ours.
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3 Equilibrium properties
Next, we define the game and discuss the properties of the equilibrium set for
the diﬀerent networks, paying particular attention to incentives for strate-
gic commitment, strategic delay, and mis-coordination and the existence of
salient equilibria.
3.1 The game
We study a dynamic game in which there are three players indexed by
i = A,B,C, and three periods indexed by t = 1, 2, 3. Each player has
an endowment of one token that he can contribute to the production of a
public good. The contribution can be made in any of the three periods, but
the decision is irreversible: once a player has committed his token, he cannot
take it back. Let xit denote the amount contributed by player i at the end
of period t. Then we can represent the state of the game in period t by a
vector
xt = (xAt, xBt, xCt) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1} × {0, 1} .
The fact that the players’ decisions are irreversible implies that xit+1 ≥ xit
for each player i; or, in vector notation, xt+1 ≥ xt. The initial state of the
game is defined to be x0 = (0, 0, 0).
The players’ payoﬀs are functions of the final state of the game x3 =
(xA3, xB3, xC3). We assume that the public good is indivisible and costs two
tokens to produce. The good is provided if and only if the total contribution
is at least two tokens. If the public good is provided, each player receives a
payoﬀ equal to two tokens plus his initial endowment of one token minus his
contribution. If the public good is not provided, each player receives a payoﬀ
equal to his initial endowment minus his contribution. Then the payoﬀ of
player i is denoted by ui (x3) and defined by
ui (x3) =
½
2 + (1− xi3) if X ≥ 2
1− xi3 if X < 2,
where X ≡ xA3 + xB3 + xC3 denotes the total contribution at the end of the
game. Note that the aggregate endowment and the aggregate value of the
public good are greater than its cost, so that provision of the good is always
feasible and eﬃcient. However, as will be shown below, the coordination
problem cannot necessarily be solved if each player has imperfect information
about the actions of players in the same network.
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To complete the description of the game, we have to specify the informa-
tion available to each player. The information structure is represented by a
directed graph or network. The network architecture is common knowledge.
A player i can observe the actions of another player j, if and only if there
is a directed edge leading from player i to player j. If player i can observe
player j then i will know, at the beginning of period t+ 1, the history of j’s
contributions up to period t.
The seven networks we study are illustrated in Figure 1 above and are
used as treatments in the experimental design. Each of these networks has a
diﬀerent architecture, a diﬀerent set of equilibria, and diﬀerent implications
for the play of the game. The games defined by the networks possess multi-
ple equilibria, so theoretical analysis alone does not tell us which outcomes
are likely to be observed; for that we need experimental data. Nonetheless,
thinking about the equilibrium set does help us make some intuitive guesses
about which outcomes might “stand out” or “suggest themselves” to human
subjects. To illustrate the implications for equilibrium behavior of the diﬀer-
ent networks and information structures, we consider a series of theoretical
examples of the underlying game. We begin with the empty network, which
serves mainly as a benchmark to which the other networks can be compared.
3.2 The empty network
In the empty network, no player can observe any other player. Although
a player can make his contribution in any of the three periods, the fact
that no one receives any information in any period makes the timing of the
decision irrelevant. This game is essentially the same as the one-shot game
in which all players make simultaneous, binding decisions. More precisely,
for each equilibrium of the one-shot game, there is a set of equilibria of the
dynamic game that have the same outcome (probability distribution over
the vector x3). Conversely, for every equilibrium of the dynamic game, there
is an equilibrium of the one-shot game with the same outcome (probability
distribution over the vector x1).
The one-shot game has multiple equilibria: There are three pure-strategy
Nash equilibria in which two players contribute and one does not and the
good is provided with probability one. To see that this is an equilibrium
strategy profile, note that the players who contribute would be worse oﬀ
choosing not to contribute (since the public good would not be provided)
and the one player who does not contribute would be worse oﬀ contributing
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(since his contribution would not increase the provision of the public good).
Conversely, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which no player
contributes and the good is not provided. Obviously, if a player thinks that
no one else will contribute, it is not optimal for him to contribute. Finally,
the one-shot game possesses a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium where
each player contributes with probability 1/2 because each player is indiﬀerent
between contributing and not contributing.1
Each of the equilibria of the one-shot game has its counterpart in the dy-
namic game. For example, consider the pure-strategy equilibrium in which A
and B contribute and C does not. In the dynamic game A and B can choose
diﬀerent periods in which to contribute or even randomize over periods. But
as long as they contribute with probability one before the end the game, their
strategies constitute an equilibrium of the dynamic game. Theory alone can-
not provide convincing guesses about which of these multiple equilibria will
occur.
3.3 The one-link network
In the empty network all players are symmetrically situated. Adding one
link to the empty network creates a simple asymmetry among the three
players. Now A can observe B’s past contributions and condition his own
decision on what B does, while B and C observe nothing. The addition of a
single link eliminates one of the equilibrium outcomes present in the empty
network. The pure-strategy sequential equilibrium with zero provision is not
an equilibrium in the one-link network. To see this, suppose to the contrary
that there exists an equilibrium in which no one contributes and consider
what happens if B deviates from this equilibrium strategy and contributes
in period 1. At the beginning of period 2, A knows that B has contributed
and he knows that C does not know this. Then A knows that C will not
contribute (C believes he is in the original equilibrium) and it is a dominant
strategy for A to contribute. Anticipating this response, B will contribute
before the final period of the game, thus upsetting the equilibrium.
The remaining equilibria of the one-shot game have their counterparts in
the dynamic game with the one-link network (as well as in dynamic games
1Positive provision of the good in equilibrium depends crucially on the fact that each
contributing player is pivotal in the sense that, at the margin, his contribution is necessary
and suﬃcient for provision (see, Bagnoli and Lipman, 1992 and Andreoni, 1998).
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with two-link networks, discussed below). These equilibria can be imple-
mented if players simply wait until the final period and then use the strategies
from the one-shot game. In addition to these simple replications of the one-
shot equilibria, there are variations in which the players choose to contribute
in diﬀerent periods or randomize their strategies. Nevertheless, the salient
feature of the one-link network is the fact that A observes B. Therefore,
although there are many sequential equilibria, those in which B contributes
first and A contributes after observing B contribute, seem salient. Whether
or not we observe equilibrium play in the laboratory, the natural asymmetry
suggests that A has an incentive to delay in order to observe whether B con-
tributes and, conversely, B has an incentive to commit in order to encourage
a contribution by A.
3.4 The two-links networks
The two-links networks can each be obtained by adding a single link to the
one-link network. Each of these networks has a variety of sequential equilib-
ria, but all of them are characterized by a positive probability of the provision
of the public good. Besides the one-link network, the line network is the only
network where all players are asymmetrically situated. The diﬀerence be-
tween the line and the one-link networks is that B can now observe C. As
a result, A is now forced to make inferences about what B has observed,
which makes the reasoning required to identify the optimal strategy quite
subtle. As in the one-link network, there is an incentive for one player to
contribute in order to encourage the player observing him, but there are two
possible pairs that can do this: either B contributes first to encourage A or
C contributes first to encourage B. Both possibilities are consistent with
equilibrium. Among others, there are pure-strategy equilibria in which B
contributes first, A contributes second and C does not contribute. There
are also pure-strategy equilibria in which C contributes first, B contributes
second and A does not contribute. Hence, the asymmetry alone cannot fully
identify which of the many equilibria are likely to emerge.
In the other two-link networks, two players are symmetrically situated,
which may intensify the coordination problem. In the star-out network, A is
the center of the star and observes the behavior of the two peripheral players,
B and C, while the peripheral players observe nothing. For A, it is weakly
dominant to wait until the last period of the game to see whether his con-
tribution is necessary to provide the public good. For B and C, there is a
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tension between their desire to contribute in order to encourage A and the
desire to be a free rider and let the other peripheral player contribute. It is
only necessary for one of the peripheral players, B or C, to encourage A. If
both contribute, there is no need for A to contribute at all. The tension be-
tween encouragement and free-riding presents B and C with a coordination
problem. In general, mis-coordination can result in either under-contribution,
where total contribution is less than two tokens and the good is not provided,
or over-contribution, where the total contribution is strictly greater than the
cost of the good. In the star-out network, over-contribution is less likely
to occur, since player A will not contribute if he sees both B and C con-
tribute. Under-contribution may well occur, however, since B and C might
each expect the other to contribute.
The star-in network is like the preceding one, but with the direction of
the edges reversed. Now A observes nothing and is observed by B and C.
A has an opportunity to encourage contribution by B and C, but this puts
B and C in a quandary. Only one of them needs to contribute. Which one
should it be? Alternatively, A might feel that if he refuses to contribute, it
will be common knowledge and the two peripheral players will be forced to
contribute. Either way, the diﬃculty of coordinating when neither peripheral
player can observe the other may result in a coordination failure, leading ei-
ther to over-contribution or under-contribution. Finally, in the pair network,
A and B observe each other, while C neither observes nor is observed by
A and B. This network is obtained by adding the edge leading from B to
A to the one-link network. This may cause a kind of coordination problem
which is diﬀerent from those in the star-in and -out networks. Because A
and B observe each other, each has an incentive to go first (to encourage
the other) and to delay (to see what the other will do). This could result in
under-contribution and non-contribution.
3.5 The complete network
In the complete network, all players are symmetrically situated so the coordi-
nation problem has no salient solution. This game has a variety of sequential
equilibria, but the public good is always provided with positive probability.
The pure-strategy equilibria all involve provision of the good with probability
one whereas the mixed strategies obviously allow for a positive probability
that the good is not provided. CGK conduct a comprehensive theoretical
and experimental study of the complete network using a number of examples
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that “span” the set of parameters that define the game.
4 Research questions
In this section, we use the equilibrium properties described in the previous
section to identify questions that can be explored using the experimental
data. Because each of the networks we study has a large number of equilibria,
the theory does not make strong predictions. Which of these equilibria is the
most plausible and whether equilibrium play is observed in the laboratory are
empirical questions. Even if the experimental data do not conform exactly
to one of the multiple equilibria, the data may suggest that some equilibria
are empirically more relevant than others.
A subject who observes one or more other subjects is called informed ;
otherwise he is called uninformed. We have suggested that a subject who is
uninformed and observed by one or more other subjects, has an incentive to
contribute early in order to encourage the other subjects to contribute. In
the one-link network, the subject in position B can contribute early in order
to encourage A to contribute. Similarly, in the line network, C can encourage
B. In the star-in network A can encourage B and C, and vice-versa in the
star-out network. Hence, we are led to the following question:
Question 1 (strategic commitment) Do subjects who are uninformed and
observed by one or more subjects make a contribution early in the game
to encourage other subjects to contribute?
An informed subject has an incentive to delay his contribution until the
final period of the game in order to gain information about the contribu-
tions of the subjects he observes. In the one-link network, it is a (weakly)
dominant strategy for the subject in position A to wait to see whether B
has contributed. In the line network, A has an incentive to wait until he
has observed B contribute, but B has a similar incentive to wait until he
has observed C. In the star-out network, A has an incentive to wait until
he has observed whether the subjects in position B and C contribute, and
vice-versa in the star-in network. This raises the following question:
Question 2 (strategic delay) Do informed subjects delay their contribu-
tions until they have observed another subject contribute?
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When two subjects are symmetrically situated in a network, the symmetry
may give rise to coordination problems. In the star-out network, the subjects
in positions B and C are symmetrically situated; as a result, each has an
incentive to commit early in order to encourage A, but each subject also
has an incentive to be a free rider. In the star-in network, B and C are
symmetrically situated; as a result, they both have an incentive to delay in
order to to observe A, but each of them also has an incentive to be a free rider
if A contributes. In the pair network, B and C are symmetrically situated;
as a result, both have an incentive to commit in order to encourage the other
and both have an incentive to delay; the diﬃculty of deciding who goes first
may lead to a coordination failure. This raises our next question:
Question 3 (mis-coordination) Do subjects who are symmetrically situ-
ated in a network have diﬃculty coordinating on an eﬃcient outcome?
The first two questions above are based on local properties of the net-
works, that is, on the edges into and out of a particular position. The third
question is based on global properties. In general, one expects global prop-
erties to matter. For example, position C is locally the same in the empty
network and the one-link network, but we expect diﬀerent behavior for a sub-
ject in these positions precisely because the network structures diﬀer with
respect to positions A and B. This observation can be applied to any pair
of networks and leads to the following question:
Question 4 (global properties) Do subjects who are otherwise similarly
situated behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent networks?
Finally, we raise a question about the relationship between equilibrium
and empirical behavior. It is very diﬃcult to establish that subjects are
behaving consistently with equilibrium, partly because there are so many
equilibria and partly because individual behavior is heterogeneous. However,
it is worth asking whether, in some cases, the modal behavior in each position
constitutes an equilibrium strategy profile. This raises the following question:
Question 5 (equilibrium behavior) Does the profile of modal behaviors
constitute an equilibrium strategy profile for some networks?
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5 Design and procedures
The experiment was run at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social
Science (PLESS) and at the UC Berkeley Experimental Social Science Lab-
oratory (Xlab). The subjects in this experiment were Princeton University
and UC Berkeley students. After subjects read the instructions, the instruc-
tions were read aloud by an experimental administrator.2 Throughout the
experiment we ensured anonymity and eﬀective isolation of subjects in order
to minimize any interpersonal influences that could stimulate cooperation.
Each experimental session lasted about one and a half hours. Payoﬀs were
calculated in terms of tokens and then converted into dollars, where each
token was worth $0.50. A $10 participation fee and subsequent earnings,
which averaged about $22, were paid in private at the end of the session.
Aside from the network structure, the experimental design and procedures
described below are identical to those used by CGK. We studied the seven
network architectures depicted in Figure 1 above. The network architecture
was held constant throughout a given experimental session. In each session,
the network positions were labeled A, B, or C. A third of the subjects were
designated type-A participants, one third type-B participants and one third
type-C participants. The subject’s type, A, B, or C, remained constant
throughout the session.
Each session consisted of 25 independent rounds and each round consisted
of three decision turns. The following process was repeated in all 25 rounds.
Each round started with the computer randomly forming three-person groups
by selecting one participant of type A, one of type B and one of type C.
The groups formed in each round depended solely upon chance and were
independent of the networks formed in any of the other rounds. Each group
played a dynamic game consisting of three decision turns.
At the beginning of the game, each participant has an endowment of one
token. At the first decision turn, each participant is asked to allocate his
tokens to either an x-account or a y-account. Allocating the token to the
y-account is irreversible. When every participant in the group has made his
decision, each subject observes the choices of the subjects to whom he is
connected in his network. This completes the first of three decision turns in
the round.
2Sample experimental instructions, including the computer program dialog windows
are available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/CGKP_I_A1.pdf.
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At the second decision turn, each subject who allocated his token to the
x-account is asked to allocate the token between the two accounts. At the
end of this period, each subject again observes the choices of the subjects to
whom he is connected in his network. This process is repeated in the third
decision turn. At each date, the information available to subjects includes
the choices they observed at the previous dates.
When the first round ends, the computer informs subjects of their payoﬀs.
The earnings in each round are determined as follows: if subjects contribute
at least two tokens to their y-accounts, each subject receives two tokens plus
the number of tokens remaining in his x-account. Otherwise, each subject re-
ceives the number of tokens in his x-account only. After subjects are informed
of their earnings, the second round starts by having the computer randomly
form new groups of participants in networks. This process is repeated until
all the 25 rounds were completed.
There were three experimental sessions for each network, except for the
complete network which is thoroughly studied by CGK. For each network
treatment, two small sessions (1 and 2) comprising 12, 15, 18, or 21 subjects
were run at Princeton and one large sessions (3) comprising 27, 33, or 36
subjects was run at Berkeley. The three sessions for each treatment were
identical except for the number of subjects and the labeling of the nodes of
the graphs, which we changed in order to see whether the labels were salient
(and as far as we could tell, they were not). Overall, the experiments provide
us with a very rich dataset. The diagram below summarizes the experimental
design and the number of observations in each treatment (the entries have the
form a / b where a is the number of subjects and b the number of observations
per game).
Networks
Session Empty One-link Line Star-out Star-in Pair Complete
1 12 / 100 15 / 125 15 / 125 18 / 150 15 / 125 18 / 150 −−
2 15 / 125 12 / 100 21 / 175 15 / 125 15 / 125 12 / 100 −−
3 33 / 275 27 / 225 36 / 300 36 / 300 36 / 300 36 / 300 33 / 275
Total 60 / 500 54 / 450 72 / 600 69 / 575 66 / 550 66 / 550 33 / 275
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6 Results
In this section, we present the experimental results. To organize the results,
we draw a distinction between two types of analysis.
• We begin our analysis with a purely descriptive overview of some impor-
tant features of the experimental data, concerning the provision of the
public good and the eﬃciency of the contribution level. Suﬃcient sta-
tistics for these two properties are the contribution rates in the various
network treatments. In this stage of the analysis we are interested in
describing the data rather than providing a formal test of predictions or
of equilibrium behavior. The experiment was not designed to compare
aggregate behavior across network treatments, and the multiplicity of
equilibria makes such comparative static properties scarce.
• We then move to a non-parametric analysis of the relationship between
the strategic behavior suggested by our discussion of the theory (in the
form of strategic commitment, strategic delay, and mis-coordination)
and the data. The analysis is mainly focused on qualitative shifts in
subjects’ behavior resulting from changes in the network architecture.
In particular, we want to see whether the implications of the theory are
reflected in subjects’ behavior and to uncover discrepancies between the
data and the predictions of any equilibrium.
Our analysis pools the data from all rounds of all sessions. Broadly
speaking, the data from the experiments at Princeton and the data from
the experiments at Berkeley present a qualitatively similar picture, with some
relatively small diﬀerences across subject pools in some networks. We discuss
the robustness of these results to subject pools, individual behavior, and
learning eﬀects later in this section.
6.1 Overview
The top panel of Table 1 reports the total contribution rates across networks.
From these data we can immediately infer the provision rates and the eﬃ-
ciency of contributions. Eﬃciency depends on the total number of contribu-
tions, not just the provision rate. More precisely, ineﬃciency can arise from
under-contribution (X < 2) and from over-contribution (X > 2). In order to
highlight the diﬀerences in eﬃciency across networks, we tabulate the rates
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of under-contribution, eﬃcient contribution (X = 2), and over-contribution.
In the bottom panel of Table 1, the average total contributions from each
pair of networks are compared using the Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-
sum test. In the last column, the provision rate in each network is compared
to the empty network.3
[Table 1 here]
In Table 1, significant diﬀerences in subjects’ behavior can be identified
across the diﬀerent networks. The highest provision rate (0.762) is observed
in the star-out network and the smallest (0.518) is observed in the empty
network. The empty network is isomorphic to the one-shot game in which
players choose their strategies simultaneously. The provision rate in the
symmetric, mixed-strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game is 1/2, which is
similar to the empirical provision rate in the empty network.
There are also considerable variations in eﬃciency across networks. The
star-out network is the most eﬃcient (0.687), whereas the empty (0.420)
and pair (0.450) networks are the least eﬃcient. In all networks, the public-
good provision rate is significantly higher than in the empty network. This
suggests that there is something about the structure of some networks that
allows subjects to coordinate eﬃciently. We return to this question later.
The highest rate of under-contribution is observed in the empty net-
work (0.482). Again, the predicted under-contribution rate in the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium of the one-shot game is 1/2, which is similar
to the empirical under-contribution rate in the empty network. The high-
est over-contribution rate (0.202) is found in the one-link network, which
also has a high under-contribution rate (0.336). We also observe high under-
contribution and over-contribution rates in the pair network (0.415 and 0.142),
which appears to indicate a mis-coordination problem, discussed further later
in the paper. The complete network in which each subject can observe the
other two subjects also has high under-contribution and over-contribution
rates (0.302 and 0.193). Thus, subject behavior is not more eﬃcient in the
3These tests assume independence, which would be satisfied, for example, if the subjects
in a given session use identical mixed strategies. If there is heterogeneity among subjects,
however, the outcomes of games in which the same subjects appear will not be independent.
This biases the standard errors downwards, increasing the likelihood of finding a significant
treatment eﬀect. There is no simple adjustment to the standard test that will take care of
the possible dependence so we have used the null of independence while recognizing that
it may not be satisfied in this case.
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complete network, which highlights the central role of the network architec-
ture in solving the coordination problem.
Next, Table 2 presents the timing of contributions across network posi-
tions. Recall that a subject in a position where he can observe other posi-
tions is called informed ; otherwise, he is called uninformed. Also, a subject
is called observed if he is in a position where he is observed by another po-
sition; otherwise, he is called unobserved. The contribution rates are defined
as the ratio of the number of contributions to the number of uncommitted
subjects, i.e., the number of subjects who still have a token to contribute.
We sometimes refer to these as conditional contribution rates. The number
in parentheses in each cell represents the number of uncommitted subjects
(subjects who have an endowment left for contribution). The last column of
Table 2 reports total contribution rates.
[Table 2 here]
For uninformed-and-observed subjects (top panel), most contributions
were made in the first period. The tendency of uninformed subjects to make
early contributions is found in all networks, but the contribution rates in
the first period and the total contribution rates vary considerably across
networks and positions. For informed subjects (middle panels), by contrast,
there is a general tendency to delay, especially if they are unobserved. For
example, the modal behavior of subjects in position B of the line network is
to contribute in the second period. Given the early contribution behavior of
position-C subjects in this network, this indicates that position-B subjects
delay their contribution until they observe that C has contributed. Finally,
the uninformed-and-unobserved subjects (bottom panel) in the one-link and
pair networks maintained low contribution rates across the three periods of
the game, but they are much more likely to contribute in the Berkeley data
than in the Princeton data (see Section 6.7).
In the remainder of this section, we use the experimental data to explore
the questions that we identified in Section 4. The analyses focus on the evo-
lution of contributions over time in the diﬀerent network treatments. This
allows us to identify further qualitative shifts in subjects’ behavior result-
ing from changes in the network architecture. In particular, we investigate
whether the qualitative features of equilibrium match the data and discuss
the implications of the data for equilibrium selection. Throughout, we at-
tempt to explain the experimental data using a single class of equilibria. To
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this end, as a working hypothesis, we assume that all players are fully ra-
tional and symmetric, and we do not allow for the possibility that diﬀerent
equilibria are played in diﬀerent instances of the same game.
6.2 Strategic commitment
Result 1 (strategic commitment) There is a strong tendency for sub-
jects who are uninformed and observed by others to contribute early.
Specifically, subjects in positions B (one-link), C (line), and A (star-
in) exhibit strategic commitment. This eﬀect is strongest for position C
(line) and is associated with a high level of eﬃciency in that network.
In Section 3, we suggested that an uninformed-and-observed subject has an
incentive to make an early contribution in order to encourage others to con-
tribute. In particular, subjects occupying positions B (one-link), C (line),
and A (star-in) should contribute in the first period according to this reason-
ing. In contrast, the uninformed-and-observed subjects occupying positions
B (star-out) and C (star-out) face a coordination problem that complicates
the analysis of incentives for strategic commitment. We return to them later.
The support for Result 1 comes from Figure 2 (below), which shows the
frequencies of contributions across time by uncommitted subjects occupying
position B (one-link), C (line), and A (star-in). We also include subjects
in position B (line). This position is diﬀerent from the others included in
Figure 2, because it is both observed by position A and observes position C.
Thus, in the line network, subjects in position B may be torn between the
incentive to contribute early and the incentive to delay.
The number above each bar in the histogram represents the number of
observations. The histograms in Figure 2 show that subjects in positions B
(one-link), C (line), and A (star-in) all exhibit a tendency toward early con-
tributions, but the actual contribution rates vary. Most noticeably, C (line)
has a higher contribution rate than the other two positions — the contribution
rate in the first period is 0.657 for C (line), whereas the corresponding rates
for B (one-link) and A (star-in) are 0.578 and 0.571, respectively — but the
diﬀerences are not statistically significant.4
4Where appropriate, we test for the diﬀerence of means by estimating probit and logit
models that account for the statistical dependence of observations caused by the repeated
appearance of the same subjects in our sample.
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[Figure 2 here]
The high contribution rate for C (line) is another reflection of the greater
eﬃciency of the line network. Given the strategic commitment of C (line), we
note that subjects in position B (line) have more in common with informed
subjects than with subjects who are uninformed and observed: most subjects
in positionB (line) contribute in the second and third periods, although there
are a few subjects contributing in the first period. Another interesting feature
of the data is the similarity of the contribution rates at positions B (one-link)
and A (star-in). Unlike B (one-link), A (star-in) may have an incentive to
delay if he thinks that he can signal to B (star-in) and C (star-in) that he
is determined to be a free rider and force the other two to contribute. Thus,
coordination in the star-in network would appear to be more diﬃcult than in
the one-link network. The fact that eﬃciency is higher in the star-in network
than in the one-link network (0.500 versus 0.452) supports this conclusion.
Nonetheless, we observe very similar contribution rates at the two positions
and similar provision rates in the two networks.
6.3 Strategic delay
Result 2 (strategic delay) There is strong evidence of strategic delay by
informed subjects. In particular, subjects at position A (one-link), B
(line), and A (star-out), tend to delay their decisions until another
subject has contributed.
As we argued in Section 3, informed subjects have an incentive to delay
making a decision to contribute until they observe that another subject has
contributed. According to this argument, subjects in positions A (one-link),
A and B (line), and A (star-out) should exhibit strategic delay. Informed
subjects in positions A, B and C (complete), B and C (star-in), and A and
B (pair) also have an incentive to delay but, because of the symmetry of
these positions in their respective network structures, the incentive to delay
is confounded with the coordination problem. For this reason, we deal with
these positions separately in the following section.
The support for Result 2 comes from Figure 3 below. For the network
positions of interest here, we present the subjects’ contribution rates, condi-
tional on their information states. The information state is 1 if a contribution
has been observed and is 0 otherwise. The number above each bar of the
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histogram represents the number of observations. There is a strong inci-
dence of strategic delay for subjects in positions A (one-link), B (line) and
A (star-out) where observing a contribution significantly increases the sub-
ject’s contribution rate. By contrast, the contribution rates for position A
(line) are low in both states. This suggests that the behavior of subjects in
position A (line) can be best described as free riding. But note that given the
tendency of subjects in positions B and C (line) to contribute, the behavior
of position-A subjects is optimal and eﬃcient.
[Figure 3 here]
6.4 Mis-coordination
Result 3 (mis-coordination) There is evidence of coordination failure in
networks where two subjects, such as B and C (star-out, star-in) and A
and B (pair), are symmetrically situated. Coordination failure explains
the majority of ineﬃcient outcomes in the star-out, star-in and pair
networks.
We have delayed the discussion of positions B and C (star-out, star-in) and A
and B (pair), because they involve a coordination problem that complicates
the analysis of incentives for strategic delay and strategic commitment. The
common feature of these pairs of positions is that they are symmetrically
situated in their respective networks. In the star-out network, B and C have
an incentive to encourage A but, at the same time, they have an incentive
to be free riders and let the other encourage A. In the star-in network, B
and C have an incentive to delay in order to see whether A contributes but,
once A has contributed, they have an incentive to be free riders and let the
other provide the public good. In the pair network, A and B have both an
incentive to encourage the other and an incentive to delay. This conflict may
lead to ineﬃcient outcomes. From the same reason, the symmetry of the
complete network architecture makes it diﬃcult for subjects to coordinate
their contributions to the provision of the public good. In fact, there is no
salient solution to the coordination problem in the complete network. We
next investigate the coordination problem in the star-out, star-in and pair
networks. We begin with the star-out network.
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6.4.1 The star-out network
We first investigate the coordination problem by revisiting the eﬃciency re-
sults presented in Table 1 above. The star-out network has the lowest rate of
over-contribution (0.078) among all networks. This result is not surprising.
Subjects in position A play the role of a central coordinator in the star-out
network. The position-A subject waits to see whether the peripheral posi-
tions, B and C, contribute and only contributes himself, if necessary, in the
last period. It is less obvious howmuch of the under-contribution rate (0.238)
is attributable to mis-coordination between B and C. To answer this ques-
tion, Figure 4 depicts the total contributions made by subjects in positions
B and C in each period. The numbers ab above each bar of the histogram
represents the rates of (a) under-contribution and (b) over-contribution after
this state the game.
[Figure 4 here]
It is interesting that the frequency of no contribution by subjects in posi-
tions B and C during the first two periods (0.205) is quite close to the rate of
under-contribution (0.238). This suggests that the under-contribution out-
comes in the star-out network are mainly caused by a coordination failure
between position-B and position-C subjects. We can check this by focusing
on the 118 (out of 575) games in which neither B nor C contributed by the
end of the second period. The public good was provided in only four of
those games. This implies that 83.2% (= 0.198/0.238) of the total under-
contribution rate is attributable to a failure by subjects in positions B and
C to coordinate their contributions.
6.4.2 The star-in network
In the star-in network, we distinguish two types of coordination failures, one
that occurs when position-A subjects contribute first and one that occurs
when they try to free ride. We divide the sample according to the timing of
contributions of position-A subjects, and re-calculate the eﬃciency results.
The new results are presented in Figure 5 below. The numbers represent the
total number of observations. One interesting feature of the data presented in
Figure 5 is that, even when the subjects in position A contribute in the first
two periods, the under- and over-contribution rates are relatively high (0.188
and 0.241, respectively) purely because of a coordination failure between the
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subjects in positions B and C. On the other hand, when position-A subjects
do not contribute, the under-contribution rate is very high (0.822), which
strongly suggests that the coordination between B and C becomes more
diﬃcult when A does not contribute. Of course, the failure to coordinate
depends on A’s refusal to commit, so this could be interpreted as a failure
of A to coordinate with B and C. In any case, the under-contribution rate
when position-A subjects do not contribute is much higher than the under-
contribution rate in the benchmark empty network (0.482).
[Figure 5 here]
6.4.3 The pair network
In the pair network, the salient solution to the coordination problem is for
A and B to contribute. According to this hypothesis, under-contribution
should be attributed to coordination failure between the subjects in posi-
tions A and B, whereas over-contribution is attributable to contributions
from subjects isolated in position C. In order to investigate the coordina-
tion failure between subjects in positions A and B, we simply compute the
relative frequency that subjects in positions A and B fail to contribute two
tokens. This turns out to be surprisingly high (0.418). The uncoordinated
contributions of position-C subjects sometimes lead to over-contribution and
sometimes compensate for under-contribution by subjects in positions A and
B. On average, as one would expect, these contributions have no eﬀect on
eﬃciency. In fact, the under-contribution rate (0.415) is almost identical to
the frequency of under-contribution by subjects in positions A and B. So we
can argue that under-contribution in the pair network is driven by the coor-
dination failure between subjects in positions A and B. Over-contribution,
on the other hand, is clearly the result of uncoordinated contributions by
position-C subjects.
6.5 Global properties
Result 4 (global properties) There is strong evidence that the global prop-
erties of the networks, as well as the local properties, are important
determinants of subjects’ behavior. One example is the behavior of iso-
lated subjects in the empty, one-link and pair networks.
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Strategic interaction between subjects is often influenced by the local proper-
ties of the networks, that is, by the links into and out of a particular position.
On the other hand, there are instances where the global properties of the net-
work have a large influence on the behavior of subjects. One easy test of the
importance of global properties is a comparison of the behavior of isolated
subjects, that is, uninformed-and-unobserved subjects in positions A, B, or
C (empty), C (one-link), and C (pair). These positions have no inward or
outward links, so if only the local properties matter, the behavior of the sub-
jects in these positions should be identical in all three networks. However, we
observe considerable diﬀerences in contributions across the three networks at
both the aggregate level and the individual level. From the last column of
Table 2 above, the contribution rate in the empty network is significantly
higher than that of subjects in positions C (one-link) and C (pair) (0.513
compared to 0.367 and 0.369, respectively), although the empirical provision
rates in these positions in the Berkeley data are very similar (see Section
6.7).
Next, we compare the patterns of contribution behavior of subjects in
positions A and B (one-link) with either positions A and B (line) or B
and C (line). It is interesting to observe how subjects’ behavior changes as
the result of one additional link from B to C. In Figures 2 and 3 above,
we observe that subjects in position C (line) have qualitatively the same
behavior as the subjects in position B (one-link), since in both positions
subjects make their contribution in the first period. Similarly, subjects in
position B (line) exhibit strategic delay just as subjects in position A (one-
link) do. Nonetheless, the eﬃciency of the line network is at least as high
as the eﬃciency of the one-link network, even though the presence of two
informed positions, A and B, and two observed positions, B and C, in the
line network suggests the possibility of coordination problems.
6.6 Equilibrium
Result 5 (equilibrium) The modal behavior of subjects in the one-link,
line and star-out networks corresponds to what some equilibria would
predict. In addition, there are considerable diﬀerences in the modal be-
havior of subjects in these networks, indicating that diﬀerent equilibria
might be plausible or salient.
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Because of the large number of equilibria in the games we studied, the theory
does not have much to say about the kinds of behavior we should expect to see
in the laboratory. Instead, we have emphasized the usefulness of experimental
data for identifying which equilibria might be plausible or salient. Now we
consider three cases in which the subjects’ behavior approximates a salient
equilibrium.
One has to be very careful in making claims that individual subjects are
playing equilibrium strategies. Given the multiplicity of equilibria and the
heterogeneity of individual behavior, it is unlikely that all subjects coordi-
nate on a single equilibrium. The most that we can claim is that the modal
behavior of the subjects bears a striking resemblance to a particular equi-
librium, while noting that there are substantial deviations from equilibrium
play on the part of some subjects. We have already alluded to the coordi-
nation problems found in the pair and star-in networks. We will thus not
attempt to reconcile subjects’ behavior in these networks with equilibrium
behavior. Instead, we focus on the one-link, line, and star-out networks. We
begin by considering the line network.
6.6.1 The line network
In the line network, the degree of coordination reflected by the eﬃciency
of outcomes appears to be very high. The frequencies of contributions in
diﬀerent positions and information states are tabulated in Table 3. The
states 0 and 1 in the table refer to the number of contributions observed by
subjects in positions A and B in periods 2 and 3. Note that in order to reduce
the number of states, we pool the data corresponding to a given number of
contributions, regardless of when the contributions were made. The number
in parentheses in each cell represents the number of observations.
[Table 3 here]
The first thing to note is the high contribution rate (0.657) of subjects in
position C in period 1. Secondly, subjects in position B contribute mainly
after they observe a contribution by the subject in position C. More precisely,
the contribution rate in position B, conditional on observing no contribution
by C, is 0.120 in period 2 and 0.333 in period 3. By contrast, the contribution
rate in position B, conditional on observing a contribution by C, is 0.542 in
period 2 and 0.506 in period 3. Finally, the total contribution rate by subjects
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in position A is only 0.267. This regularity suggests (an equivalence class of)
equilibria in which C contributes in period 1, B contributes after observing
C contribute, and A does not contribute at all. There are deviations from
this equilibrium pattern, notably the contributions by subjects in position B
when they have not observed any contribution by the subject in position C.
But these deviations are not large and the behaviors of subjects in positions C
and A are quite close to those predicted by this class of equilibria. Finally, we
note that the overall behavioral tendencies predicted by this class of equilibria
are more closely replicated in the Princeton experimental data. In fact, the
relative frequencies of contributions in the last two periods are surprisingly
close to the corresponding equilibrium predictions (see Section 6.7).
There are some interesting cases in the data where subjects deviate from
the suggested equilibrium behavior. In period 2, position-A subjects are
much more likely to contribute if they observe that the subject in position
B has contributed in period 1, that is, before he can observe the subject
in position C contribute. Subjects in position A may have reasoned that
this behavior was intended to encourage them to contribute and, in any case,
preempts any possible revelation of the behavior of the subject in position C.
Given the high probability that subjects in position C contribute in period
1, such reasoning by subjects is faulty, but it is interesting nonetheless. In
period 3, we notice that subjects in position A are less likely to contribute
if the subject in position B has contributed in periods 1 or 2; most of these
observations are cases in which B contributed in period 2, thus signaling an
earlier contribution by C. These observations suggest some rationality, even
if they do not correspond exactly to the proposed equilibrium.
6.6.2 The star-out network
The next case we consider is the star-out network. The frequencies of con-
tributions in diﬀerent positions and information states are summarized in
Table 4 below. The states 0, 1, and 2 refer to the number of contributions
observed by subjects in positions A and B in periods 2 and 3. Again, in order
to reduce the number of states, we pool the data corresponding to diﬀerent
histories that lead to the same information state. The number in parentheses
in each cell represents the number of observations.
[Table 4 here]
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Here we see a good illustration of strategic delay by position-A subjects:
out of 575 observations, there are only 119 contributions in the first two
periods, of which 55 (46.2% of the time) occur in period 2 after one of the
peripheral subjects in positions B or C has contributed. Although further
delay would be optimal, the deviation from rational behavior seems small.
By contrast, subjects in positions B and C have an incentive to contribute
early to encourage the subject in position A, and on average they contribute
in the first two periods 51% of the time. In the last period, their contribution
rate falls precipitously to 0.066. The patterns here suggest (an equivalence
class of) equilibria in which B and C contribute in the first two periods with
probability 1/2 and contribute with probability 0 in the last period, while
A waits until the last period and contributes only if he observes exactly one
contribution by B or C in the preceding periods.
Also notice that the timing of contributions by the subjects in positions
B and C matters only to the extent that the total probability of contribu-
tion in the first two periods must be 1/2 in equilibrium; the contribution
probability in individual periods is immaterial. Thus, the fact that subjects
contribute in one of the two periods with probability 0.510 is what matters;
the contribution rates in period 1 and in period 2 are irrelevant. Position-A
subjects match the prescribed behavior very closely in period 1 and period
3. Only in period 2 is there a significant deviation. In three cases, subjects
in position A contributed in period 2 after observing two contributions in
the previous period. The numbers are very small and should be attributed
to the ‘trembling hand.’
6.6.3 The one-link network
Next, we consider the one-link network. Table 5 below summarizes the fre-
quencies of contributions in diﬀerent positions and information states in the
one-link network. The number in parentheses in each cell represents the
number of observations. Note that conditional on observing the subject in
position B contribute, the contribution rates of subjects in position A are
0.359 and 0.456 in periods 2 and 3, respectively. It appears that subjects are
randomizing, but the contribution rate of subjects in position C (0.367) is too
low to make subjects indiﬀerent between contributing and not contributing.
Likewise, when subjects in position A do not observe the subject in position
B contribute, it cannot be optimal for them to randomize in periods 2 and
3: the contribution rates of subjects in position C and subjects in position
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B in period 3 are too low.
[Table 5 here]
In conclusion, the data summarized in Table 5 are mixed, with several
features that are diﬃcult to reconcile with equilibrium behavior. By analogy
with our findings in the line network, one might expect the salient equilib-
rium to be one in which B contributes first, A contributes after observing
B contribute, and C never contributes. The bare facts appear inconsistent
with this prediction. Overall, the isolated subjects in position C contribute
on average 0.367 of the time. Similarly, subjects in position A contribute
0.233 of the time without having observed a contribution by the subject in
position B. Even when they have observed a contribution by the subject in
position B, the contribution rate of subjects in position A is only 0.406. One
anomaly here appears to be the contribution behavior of subjects in position
C. Since they can neither observe nor be observed, they have no ability to
coordinate and yet they make a significant number of contributions. Since
subjects learn the outcome of the game at the end of each round, subjects
in position A may become aware of the contribution behavior of subjects in
position C and decide to free ride to some extent.
What cannot be ascertained from the information given in Table 5 is
whether these anomalies are endemic or caused by a few subjects. To pursue
this question, it is necessary to investigate behavior at an individual level.
The failure to match the predictions of the salient equilibrium cannot be
blamed entirely on a couple of outliers. A study of individual behavior in
the one-link network shows that the failure to match the predictions of the
salient equilibrium cannot be blamed entirely on a couple of outliers. In
most experiments, there is evidence of heterogeneity among subjects and this
experiment is no diﬀerent — some subjects have an above-average tendency
to contribute to the public good and some are very unwilling to contribute.
At any rate, whatever the explanation, it is hard to argue that the average
behavior of subjects in position A is optimal.
6.6.4 The complete, star-in and pair networks
Overall, the preceding analysis of the line, star-out and one-line networks
suggests that the salient equilibria we identify account for much of the large-
scale features of the data. The picture is somewhat diﬀerent for the complete,
star-in, and pair networks.
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In the complete network, where all subjects are symmetrically situated,
there is no salient equilibrium, in the sense we have used the term. CGK in-
vestigate the complete network, using a set of parameter profiles (E,K, T, V )
that allow them to test the robustness of the results to changes in individual
parameters. The basic regularities from the CGK experiments are that the
theory can account for the behavior observed in the laboratory in most of the
treatments, and that several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect
equilibrium are replicated in the data.
In the star-in network, as noted before, we observe two kinds of coor-
dination failures, due to the diﬃculty of position-A subjects (the center of
the star) to coordinate with the subjects in positions B and C (the two
peripheral subjects). One such diﬃculty arises if the position-A subject con-
tributes first; because the subjects in positions B and C are symmetrically
situated, it results in a game of chicken between those two. The other kind
of coordination failure arises when the position-A subject fails to contribute.
The pair network is one case where the apparently salient equilibria do not
capture the actual behavior of subjects in practice. The data indicate that
this arises for two reasons: first, the isolated subjects in position C contribute
a significant amount, even though it is impossible for them to coordinate
their actions with the other subjects; second, subjects in positions A and
B, where coordination is possible in theory, fail to coordinate in practice,
possibly because of the significant contribution pattern of the position-C
subjects.
For the sake of completeness, Tables 6, 7, and 8 below tabulate the fre-
quencies of contributions in the complete star-in, and pair networks, respec-
tively.
[Table 6 here]
[Table 7 here]
[Table 8 here]
6.7 Robustness
We next turn to a finer analysis of the data by breaking the data down by sub-
ject pool. Overall, the data from the experiments at Princeton and the data
from the experiments at Berkeley present a qualitatively similar picture. The
diﬀrences are restricted to the behavior of isolated subjects (uninformed-and-
unobserved) in the one-link and pair networks and the behavior of subjects
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in the line network. The behavior of the isolated subjects in the one-link and
pair networks does not aﬀect the modal behavior in these networks, and so
we draw the same conclusions from both subject pools separately as from
the pooled analysis.
The diﬀerences between the Princeton and Berkeley data are more sub-
stantial in the line network. In the first decision turn, the position-A sub-
jects are more likely to contribute (0.173) and the position-C subjects are
less likely to contribute (−0.320) in the Berkeley data than in the Princeton
data. These diﬀerences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.5
There is also a marginally significant diﬀerence in the second decision turn,
where position-B subjects in the Berkeley sample are less likely to contribute
(−0.318) if they observe a contribution by a position-C subject. Finally, in
the third decision turn, both position-A and position-B subjects are more
likely to contribute (0.153 and 0.275, respectively) if they have not observed
a contribution in the Berkeley sample as compared to the Princeton sample.
Both of these findings suggest that in the line network the subjects in the
Berkeley sample developed diﬀerent expectations about the actions of the
other subjects in the same network, and this seems to lead them to converge
in the direction of a diﬀerent equilibrium. As we have argued, it is not clear
to us which of two equilibria is the more salient, the one in which the A
and B contribute or the one in which B and C contribute. Perhaps it is not
surprising that we do not get a clear answer from both samples. There was
also more coordination failure in the Berkeley data — the eﬃciency (X = 2)
of the line network in the Berkeley sample was 0.487 compared to 0.653 the
Princeton sample. Apart from the diﬀerences in the line network, we observe
the same regularities in both subject pools, which gives us some confidence
that our conclusions are robust.
When we look at the other networks, only few quantitative diﬀerences
in contribution rates are significant and none change the main findings from
the full analysis of the pooled data. One of these quantitative diﬀerences is
that the isolated subjects in the one-link and pair networks are more likely
to contribute in the Berkeley data than in the Princeton data. In the empty
network, where all subjects are uninformed and unobserved, the contribution
rate is higher, though not significantly so, in the Princeton data than in the
5To estimate the size and significance of the subject pool eﬀects, we ran probit regres-
sions of the empirical averages on a campus dummy with cluster-robust standard errors.
The numbers in brackets are percentage points.
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Berkeley data. So it is in the asymmetric situations – where salience would
seem to suggest that isolated subjects, who cannot coordinate with the other
subjects, should not contribute – that the Berkeley subjects are more likely
to contribute. In fact, the contribution rates of the isolated Berkeley subjects
in the one-link and the pair networks are similar to the contribution rates
of subjects the in the empty network. This could suggest an altruistic, non-
strategic behavior on the part of the Berkeley subjects though, given the large
number of equilibria, there may be other equally plausible explanations.6
In the one-link network, there are also significant diﬀerences between the
Berkeley and Princeton data in the behavior of the subjects in positions A
and B: a lower contribution rate (−0.311) by position-A subjects at the
second decision turn after observing a contribution and a lower contribution
rate (−0.247) by position-B subjects at the third decision turn. These lower
rates may be a response to the higher contributions by subjects in position C.
In the pair network, we observe two significant diﬀerences: the contribution
rates of subjects in positions A and B in the Berkeley sample are lower at
the second and third decision turns (−0.211 and −0.293, respectively) after
observing a contribution. Again, this could be a response to the higher
contributions of the isolated subjects at position C. These diﬀrences are all
significant at the 5 percent level.
Finally, in the star-out network we observe a few diﬀerences in contribu-
tion rates, but the diﬀerences are quantitatively small. The Berkeley subjects
in position A are slightly more likely to contribute (0.107) in the first decision
turn. The other diﬀerences are explained by the “trembling hand,” the small
numbers of contributions made by subjects in position A who have already
observed two contributions. So both sets of data seem to support our con-
clusions about salience and equilibrium in the star-out network. Finally, in
the star-in network, there are no significant diﬀerences between the Berkeley
data and the Princeton data.
To examine robustness to learning, we conducted a parallel analysis of
the data using only the last 15 rounds of each session. The findings are
very similar the all-round pooled data, with some small improvements in
coordination rates over time. We also investigated behavior at the level of
the individual subject. Not surprisingly, there is some heterogeneity across
6The fact that the isolated subjects in the Berkeley experiments have similar contribu-
tion rates in diﬀerent networks weakens the support for our claim that global as well as
local properties of network architecture matter (Result 4), but the claim is supported by
the behavior of isolated subjects in the Princeton experiments and by other observations.
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subjects. Nevertheless, the choices made by most of our subjects reflect
cleanly classifiable strategies which are stable across decision-rounds. As far
as we could tell, “session eﬀects” were caused by a few subjects in a session.
7 Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that diﬀerent network architectures lead to diﬀerent
outcomes in coordination games. Moreover, asymmetry in the network ar-
chitecture is an important factor in creating the salience of certain strategies
that lead to these diﬀerent outcomes. Asymmetric networks give diﬀerent
roles to diﬀerent subjects, making their behavior more predictable and aid-
ing the coordination of their actions.7 We identify several ways in which
this predictability occurs in our data from monotone games. Two persistent
types of behavior are strategic commitment in some network positions and
strategic delay in other positions. We observe passivity in some positions,
particularly isolated subjects, who can neither observe others’ actions nor
have their choices observed by anyone else: such subjects are less likely to
contribute. As a result, the structure of observability in the network archi-
tecture seems to make certain behaviors — and possibly certain equilibria —
salient. The bottom line is that asymmetry gives rise to salience which, in
turn, is an aid to predictability and coordination. These regularities do not
yet have a rigorous theoretical explanation, of course, but the regularity of
our findings suggests an intriguing set of open questions that are ripe for
theoretical research.
There is clearly a lot more to be done and the uses of our data set are
far from exhausted. We varied the informational network for one specific
three-person, three-period voluntary contribution game. The game was cho-
sen because of the richness of the equilibrium set and because observability
seemed intuitively to be an important factor in selecting among equilibria. To
determine more precisely which factors are important in explaining strategic
behavior in dynamic coordination games, it will also be useful to investigate
a larger class of games in the laboratory. The methodology and approach
we use could be applied to other versions of dynamic coordination games
where theory makes weak (or no) predictions about equilibrium selection,
7Recent theoretical work about the relationship between symmetries and focal points
suggest a possible connection between asymmetries and equilibrium selection. See Alos-
Ferrer and Kuzmics (2008).
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and observability could plausibly be a critical selection factor.
While the present paper does not propose a specific theoretically-grounded
structural model that might be applied to the data, we view that as the key
next step to understanding the eﬀect of observational networks in multiplayer
coordination games. We attempted to explore the application of Quantal
Response Equilibrium (QRE) analysis (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998) of
these games, but there were problems of tractability because of the multi-
plicity of equilibria and bifurcations in the logit equilibrium correspondence.
In fact, in the presence of imperfect information and simultaneous moves,
even in the case of three-person networks, characterizing the set of QRE is
computationally intensive. Another possible approach is to consider models
with cognitive hierarchies, such as level-k theory, but the application of these
approaches to complex multistage games with repeated play is bedeviled by
the problem of specifying the behavior of 0-level type. We hope the results
that reported here open up future theoretical and experimental research on
these questions. We believe that our approach can be applied to study the
role of network architecture in other kinds of games.
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Under
0 1 2 3 contribution
Empty 0.092 0.390 0.404 0.114 0.482 0.518
One-link 0.071 0.264 0.462 0.202 0.336 0.664
Line 0.087 0.215 0.570 0.128 0.302 0.698
Star-out 0.146 0.092 0.683 0.078 0.238 0.762
Star-in 0.087 0.276 0.462 0.175 0.364 0.636
Pair 0.098 0.316 0.444 0.142 0.415 0.585
Complete 0.076 0.225 0.505 0.193 0.302 0.698
Empty One-link Line Star-out Star-in Pair Complete Provision
Empty -- 0.000 0.469 0.046 0.006 0.179 0.003 --
One-link 0.000 -- 0.001 0.000 0.264 0.011 0.756 0.000
Line 0.000 0.243 -- 0.005 0.029 0.504 0.013 0.000
Star-out 0.000 0.001 0.015 -- 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Star-in 0.000 0.355 0.026 0.000 -- 0.137 0.523 0.000
Pair 0.028 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.084 -- 0.059 0.028
Complete 0.000 0.346 0.996 0.048 0.078 0.002 -- 0.000
Provision
Wilcoxon (Mann-Whitney) rank-sum test - under (white) / over (gray)
Table 1. The total number of contributions and provision rate by network
Network Total contributions 
Contribution
rate
One-link B 0.578 (450) 0.432 (190) 0.213 (108) 0.811
Line C 0.657 (600) 0.121 (206) 0.160 (181) 0.747
Star-out B , C 0.395 (1150) 0.191 (696) 0.066 (563) 0.543
Star-in A 0.571 (550) 0.250 (236) 0.175 (177) 0.735
0.517 (2750) 0.225 (1328) 0.117 (1029) 0.669
Contribution
rate
One-link A 0.140 (450) 0.248 (387) 0.409 (291) 0.618
Line A 0.100 (600) 0.046 (540) 0.146 (515) 0.267
Star-out A 0.096 (575) 0.123 (520) 0.507 (456) 0.609
Star-in B , C 0.165 (1100) 0.176 (919) 0.266 (757) 0.495
0.132 (2725) 0.147 (2365) 0.310 (2019) 0.489
Contribution
rate
Line B 0.187 (600) 0.406 (488) 0.434 (290) 0.727
Pair A , B 0.255 (1100) 0.306 (819) 0.283 (568) 0.630
Complete A, B, C 0.179 (825) 0.260 (677) 0.349 (501) 0.605
0.214 (2525) 0.315 (1984) 0.340 (1359) 0.645
Contribution
rate
Empty A , B , C 0.351 (1500) 0.084 (973) 0.181 (891) 0.513
One-link C 0.244 (450) 0.065 (340) 0.104 (318) 0.367
Pair C 0.265 (550) 0.064 (404) 0.082 (378) 0.369
0.313 (2500) 0.076 (1717) 0.142 (1587) 0.455
( ) - # of obs.
Average
Average
Average
Average
1 2 3
1 2 3
C. Informed and observed
Network Position
Period
Period
3
D. Uninformed and unobserved
2 3
B. Informed and unobserved
Network Position
Period
1
Table 2. The evolution of contributions over time by uninformed and informed types
A. Uninformed and observed
Network Position
Network Position
Period
1 2
C
State --
0.657
(600)
State 0 1 0 1 --
0.023 0.156 0.120 0.542 0.121
(444) (96) (158) (330) (206)
State 0 1 0 1 --
0.204 0.091 0.333 0.506 0.160
(250) (265) (120) (170) (181)
( ) - # of obs.
(600)
2 Freq.
3 Freq.
Table 3. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the line network
A B
1
-- --
Freq. 0.100 0.187(600)
 
B,C
State --
0.395
(1150)
State 0 1 2 --
0.033 0.206 0.043 0.191
(183) (267) (70) (696)
State 0 1 2 --
0.067 0.894 0.038 0.066
(105) (246) (105) (563)
( ) - # of obs.
2 Freq.
3 Freq.
Table 4. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the star-out network
A
1
--
Freq. 0.096(575)
 
B C
State -- --
0.578 0.244
(450) (450)
State 0 1 -- --
0.102 0.359 0.432 0.065
(167) (220) (190) (340)
State 0 1 -- --
0.294 0.456 0.213 0.104
(85) (206) (108) (318)
( ) - # of obs.
2 Freq.
3 Freq.
Table 5. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the one-link network
A
1
--
Freq. 0.140(450)
 
State
State 0 1 2
0.325 0.126 0.167
(453) (206) (18)
State 0 1 2
0.220 0.470 0.072
(132) (300) (69)
( ) - # of obs.
Table 6. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the complete network
2 Freq.
A,B,C
1
--
Freq.
3 Freq.
0.179
(825)
 
A
State --
0.571
(550)
State -- 0 1
0.250 0.101 0.234
(236) (397) (522)
State -- 0 1
0.175 0.234 0.283
(177) (265) (492)
( ) - # of obs.
2 Freq.
3 Freq.
Table 7. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the star-in network
B,C
1
--
Freq. 0.165(1100)
 
C
State --
0.265
(550)
State 0 1 --
0.295 0.341 0.064
(614) (205) (404)
State 0 1 --
0.252 0.322 0.082
(310) (258) (378)
( ) - # of obs.
3 Freq.
A,B
1
--
Freq. 0.255
Table 8. The frequencies of contributions at different states in the pair network
2 Freq.
(1100)
 
 
Figure 1: The networks 
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Figure 2. The frequencies of contributions across time for selected positions
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Figure 3. The frequencies of contribution at payoff-relevant states for selected positions
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Figure 4. The total contributions across time in the star-out network by subjects in positions B  and C 
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Figure 5. Efficiency in the star-in network conditional on the timing of contribution of position-A  subjects
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